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Abstract
The impact of economic institutions on development is presently taken for granted
but there is surprisingly scarce evidence on the channels through which institutions
affect the organization of output. Imperfections in contractual enforcement, for
example, could lead firms to adopt technologies that inefficiently minimize depen-
dence on other sectors, thus going hand in hand with a reduction in productivity.
Another channel would be the concentration of economic activity in sectors that
have fewer interactions with other sectors. Using a dataset on manufacturing,
this paper presents empirical evidence supporting both effects: better contractual
enforcement raises relatively more the labor share of sectors that interact more
with other sectors; further, good governance also boosts relatively more labor pro-
ductivity in more complex subsectors of manufacturing. Both effects are strongest
among countries whose labor productivity ranks in the second and third quar-
tiles of the world productivity distribution and they are mute for the two extreme
groups of poor and developed economies.
JEL Codes: O43, P16.
Keywords: Sectoral organization of output, institutions, contractual enforcement,
input-output, complexity.
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1 Introduction
The impact of economic institutions on development is presently taken for granted (for
landmark references see e.g. Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and references therein
for a detailed and comprehensive literature overview) but there is surprisingly scarce
evidence on the channels through which institutions affect the organization of output.
In this paper, we examine the implications of poor contractual enforcement for the
organization of output across sectors.
Imperfections in contract enforcement raise the cost of interacting with others. This
suggests that, in environments where such frictions are important, firms would economize
on interactions with other firms or economic agents. Conditional on the production of
a given good, they would have incentives to adopt more in-house production and avoid
acquiring inputs and services from outside the boundaries of the firm (this would be
the case provided the contracting costs internal to the firm were less severe than those
associated with outside parties). Thus, the quality of contractual enforcement would
determine the choice of technology, with less efficient technologies going together with
poorer institutions. We label this effect the “productivity effect.”
Another way in which contractual enforcement could affect the organization of out-
put, a consequence of the former effect, is by shifting resources toward sectors that
interact less with others. This would follow from the fact that costly contractual en-
forcement would lower input productivity relatively more in sectors where the interaction
with other sectors is important and thus reduce labor demand in those sectors. We label
this effect the “allocation effect.” The change in the allocation of labor across sectors
could take place despite the choice of technology not suffering significant reductions in
measured productivity: it could simply be the case that firms only produce when they
can use an efficient technology and, whenever contractual imperfections impose too high
a cost on a given sector, there is simply no output there. In this scenario, we would
see important shifts in the way labor is allocated across sectors (better contractual en-
forcement raising the labor shares of more complex sectors) but with productivity not
being systematically affected by enforcement quality. Of course both effects on the
organization of output could take place simultaneously.
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The idea that technology choice is influenced by the institutional environment has
received some attention in the literature. In the context of a Ricardian trade model,
Costinot (2009) offers microfoundations for ways in which contractual imperfections
may affect the productivity of firms and comparative advantage. In his model, better
institutional quality and higher human per worker capital are complementary sources
of comparative advantage. Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) build on the ideas
of Costinot to propose a tractable general equilibrium model showing that contractual
imperfections (contractual incompleteness) leads to the adoption of less advanced tech-
nologies, and that the impact of contractual incompleteness is more pronounced when
there is greater complementary among the intermediate inputs. They further argue (by
resorting to a stylized simulation) that the frictions they consider are a quantitatively
important source of productivity differences across countries. As in Costinot, they make
the case that institutions are a source of comparative advantage.
On the empirical side, Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) show that institutions are
an important determinant of the direction of trade flows and, as such, of comparative
advantage. Nunn shows that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in
the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important.
According to his estimates, contract enforcement would explain more of the pattern of
trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined. Levchenko extends a Heckscher-
Ohlin model to incorporate institutional quality and shows that only the country with
better institutions will produce the good where more than one input is required. He finds
wide empirical support for the positive effect of institutional quality on comparative
advantage.
On a different but related front, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) show that developing
countries have disproportionately large labor shares in sectors with high volatility, both
idiosyncratic as well as global sectoral risk. Their variance decomposition indicates that
more than half the differential in output volatility between the top 5% and the bottom
5% countries in terms of GDP per capita is due to differences in the sectoral allocation of
output. This evidence poses a big question mark on the reasons behind such apparently
suboptimal allocation of labor to sectors.1 Our results indicate that institutional quality
1We label this patter suboptimal because it differs from that of developed countries as documented
in Koren and Tenreyro. Presumably, more developed economies face less restrictions in the choice of
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is an important part of the answer.
Estimates of the sectoral impact of institutions on trade patterns bundle together
productivity and allocation effects. Comparative advantage in institutionally dependent
sectors is interpreted as resulting from the impact of institutions on technology which
could then raise labor demand and the labor share and output of those sectors relative
to others. The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of institutions on the organi-
zation of domestic output by separating the productivity and labor allocation channels
and without confining it to the relevance of a country’s openness to trade. We will do
so by focussing on the decomposition of output per worker in a country as the product
of the share of workers in a given sector times the labor productivity of that sector. By
regressing the sectoral labor share on the product of institutional quality and an index
of the complexity of a sector’s interactions with other sectors (together with country
and sector dummies), we will be able to assess whether or not institutions dispropor-
tionately shift production toward sectors whose complexity necessarily requires greater
institutional quality. This is the first attempt we are aware of of empirically isolating
the impact of institutions on the allocation effect explicitly and beyond the impact of
trade. Further, we will try to answer the question of whether institutional quality also
affects the choice of technology by regressing the second factor, labor productivity, on
the same product of institutional quality and sectoral complexity. In this endeavour, we
second Cowan and Neut (2007) who carry out a direct test of the productivity effect for
a broad cross-section of countries, focussing on the manufacturing industry.
Using a dataset on manufacturing, this paper presents empirical evidence support-
ing both effects: better contractual enforcement raises relatively more the labor share
of sectors that interact more with other sectors; further, good governance also boosts
relatively more labor productivity in more complex subsectors of manufacturing.2 Both
effects are strongest among countries whose labor productivity ranks in the second and
third quartiles of the world productivity distribution and they vanish among developed
technology and in the sectoral allocation of output.
2Here, we replicate the findings of Cowan and Neut, also performed on manufacturing subsectors.
Our quantitative estimates are similar to theirs (see, e.g., on Table 3, the columns for “Rule of Law”
and “Efficiency of the Judiciary”). We also examine a different dataset of developed economies but with
more sectors, and find no evidence of institutional impact on the organization of output in relation to
the complexity of a sector’s interactions with other sectors.
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economies. Overall, the evidence strongly supports the effect of governance on the way
labor is allocated across sectors, with those that are more complex and thus more con-
tract dependent receiving disproportionate shares of labor when good law enforcement
is present.
Our paper is also related to recent work by Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012) and
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) among others. Relative to the literature, Herrendorf et
al. propose a finer, five-sector decomposition of aggregate output to identify which sec-
tors contribute the most to the lower total factor productivity (TFP) of developing
countries. They find that, in equipment, construction, and food the sectoral TFP dif-
ferences between developing countries and the United States are much larger than in
the aggregate. However, in manufactured consumption the sectoral TFP differences are
about equal to the aggregate TFP differences, and in services they are much smaller.
Our results on the productivity effect are complementary to these.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find sizeable differences in the productivity of both labor
and capital across firms within a given industry in both India and China, as compared
to the United States. Were capital and labor reallocated to equalize marginal products
to the extent observed in the United States, they estimate manufacturing TFP gains of
30%—50% in China and 40%—60% in India would materialize. This resonates with our
findings, though our data only allows us to analyze productivity effects at the sectoral
level.
We believe our results are one more piece in the puzzle of understanding aggregate
productivity. Institutions have implication that are deeper than their direct effects on
productivity alone and this paper follows up on the most logical and immediate conse-
quence of institutionally impacted productivity differentials, the effect of productivity
on labor shares.
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2 Model and Estimation Procedure
2.1 Model
We begin with the following decomposition of value added per worker in a given country:
Yc
Lc
=
N∑
i=1
Yic
Lic
Labor productivity in sector i
Lic
Lc
Share of sector i in total employment
(1)
where c denotes country and i is for sector. Yc is value added in country c and Lc the
number of workers engaged in the production of Yc. Yic and Lic are value added and
employment at the sector level, and there are N sectors of activity in the economy.
Equation (1) shows that output per worker can be split into a sum of a product of
two factors, namely labor productivity in a given sector and that sector’s share of total
employment.
We think of output in sector i being generated by a production functionAi (Cc)F
(
Ki, Li,
∑Ji
j=1Xj; C
where Cc is a measure of the quality of contractual enforcement in country c, Ai a mea-
sure of total factor productivity in sector i possibly affected by the quality of contractual
enforcement, Ki and Li inputs of capital and labor employed in this sector and Xj the
amount of intermediate inputs acquired by sector i from sector j, out of Ji sectors with
whom sector i transacts:
Yic = Ai (Cc)F
(
Kic, Lic,
Ji∑
j=1
Xj ; Cc
)
. (2)
We choose to condition the F (·) part of the production function on Cc to allow for the
possibility that the effect of contractual enforcement, if any, affects output beyond its
potential impact on TFP. We come back later to this issue.
In line with the literature (see references above), we postulate that lower quality of
contract enforcement is harmful for production processes that have many interactions
with other parties. If, say, a company has to hire many workers, acquires many inputs
from other sectors (and thus from outside sources) and engages a variety of different
types of capital, it becomes heavily dependent on these transactions and, as such, on the
quality of contractual enforcement to make them happen (and to provide incentives to its
business parties toward good outcomes). By comparison, a good that can be produced
5
using only a few intermediate inputs and which does not require specific capital nor
engaging many laborers will be much more insulated from variations in the quality of
contractual enforcement. We conclude from here that good contractual enforcement is
especially beneficial for sectors that rely heavily on interactions with others.
More formally, we assume that, for two values of contractual quality C1 and C2, with
C2 > C1,
Ai (C2)F
(
Ki, Li,
Ji∑
j=1
Xj; C2
)
> Ai (C1)F
(
Ki, Li,
Ji∑
j=1
Xj; C1
)
, (3)
Ai (C2)
∂F
(
Ki, Li,
∑Ji
j=1Xj ; C2
)
∂Ki
> Ai (C1)
∂F
(
Ki, Li,
∑Ji
j=1Xj; C1
)
∂Ki
, (4)
Ai (C2)
∂F
(
Ki, Li,
∑Ji
j=1Xj ; C2
)
∂Li
> Ai (C1)
∂F
(
Ki, Li,
∑Ji
j=1Xj; C1
)
∂Li
. (5)
Equation (3) says that better contractual enforcement will raise output, while equations
(4) and (5) indicate that this effect will carry over to the marginal products of labor and
capital.
Consider now the effects of reducing contractual quality from C2 to C1 in a given
country, a reduction taking place for exogenous reasons that remain otherwise orthogonal
to the functioning of the economy.3 Firms operating competitively equate the marginal
product of inputs to their opportunity costs, respectively wages and the interest rate.
Since, by assumption, lower contracting quality lowers the marginal product of inputs, it
follows that sectors where the reduction in productivity due to lower contracting quality
is the greatest would suffer the largest reduction in their optimally chosen input levels.
If there is no international factor mobility (closed economy), then full employment of all
inputs would require wages and interest rates to decline. If there is factor mobility and
the country in question is a small open economy, then factors would migrate. Either way,
there would be a shift in input usage toward industries where the productivity effects of
lower contractual quality were felt the least and away from those production processes
that are contract intensive.
3The effects of institutions on the overall functioning of the economy are empirically captured through
country fixed effects.
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In terms of the decomposition of sectoral output in (1), we would expect to see lower
enforcement quality negatively affect the productivity term. This is the productivity
effect. Further, the reallocation of inputs (labor in particular) toward sectors whose
productivity is less institution sensitive would raise the labor shares of those sectors.
This is the allocation effect. This would mean that an economy with poor institutions
could look rather different from an economy with good enforcement quality at the level
of sectoral composition. An interesting possibility is that these effects take place in
an extreme form: in the presence of fixed costs or other nonconvexities, it could be
that firms suffering a reduction in productivity would simply stop producing in those
sectors. What we would then observe would be a large shift in labor shares toward
institution-independent sectors but without productivity losses. Of course this would
still be a manifestation of the productivity effect: it is precisely because of the reduction
in productivity that labor is reallocated across sectors. But firms minimize out their
losses and so avoid producing in sectors in which they are no longer efficient, causing
the productivity reduction not to show.
2.2 Estimation Procedure
From the previous discussion, we set out to estimate the following equations:
Lict
Lct
= α1 + β1enforcementct.complexityi,US,t + µ1i + µ1c + µ1t + ε1ict, (6)
ln
(
Yict
Lict
)
= α2 + β2enforcementct.complexityi,US,t + µ2i + µ2c ++µ2t + ε2ict. (7)
with i denoting sector, c country and t time. The interaction terms on the right-hand
side cross measures of the quality of contract enforcement with measures of sector com-
plexity given by US sectoral allocations. The terms µ
1i and µ1c are sector and country
dummies, whereas µ
1t is a time dummy. Similar notation applies for equation (7). This
regression format was first made popular in the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998). In
the present framework, it captures the notion that contractual enforcement is relatively
more beneficial for sectors which have more complex productive structures. Because
of the cross-country nature of our data, likely to contain a very nonlinear series of
productivity values as we go from poorer to richer countries, we chose to perform the
productivity regression in logs.
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Following the discussion above, we think of contracting costs to be positively related
to the intensity of exchanges that a sector has to carry out with other sectors. We label
this variable “complexity.” In line with the literature (see e.g. Blanchard and Kremer
(1997), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007)), we resort to the Input-Output matrix of the
United States to measure the degree of concentration of exchanges carried out by each
sector. The Herfindahl index is calculated for each sector as follows. First, the column
data is transformed into shares (the initial column magnitude is divided by the sum of
that column’s total). The Herfindahl index is computed out of these shares for each
column, giving a sectoral measure of concentration. The larger the concentration, the
least the interaction with other sectors (the Herfindahl index takes the maximum value
of unity in the case that a sector’s inputs all come from a single sector). In order to
correctly measure complexity, we need its reciprocal and so use 1/Herfindahl as our
measure of complexity. As in Rajan and Zingales, we use a measure of complexity from
the United States (US) for all countries. The idea is that the productive structure of
that country would face the least contracting constraints of all, thus reflecting a kind of
“ideal” measure of sectoral complexity.
From the model presented in section 2.1, we expect β
1
to be positive and significant
reflecting the allocation effect of contracting quality. To the extent that the productivity
effect does not take place in an extreme form, estimates of β
2
should be positive and sig-
nificant. Insignificant estimates of β
2
would mean that firms opt for dropping production
when they face contract-induced productivity losses, in fact an extreme manifestation
of the productivity effect.
3 Data and Estimation
3.1 Data
Industrial Statistics We use two main datasets regarding employment, wages
and productivity measures. One is INDSTAT2 2012, the Industrial Statistics Database
in 2012 (2-digit level of ISIC code, revision 3) from the United Nations Industrial Devel-
opment Organization (henceforth referred to as the UNIDO dataset). The other is the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development STAN database for Structural
Analysis (henceforth STAN dataset). We collect sectoral employment and productivity
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measures (based on value added) from both sources. UNIDO contains only data on
manufacturing sectors whereas STAN has a more general sectoral coverage but it only
covers developed economies. We find this diversity useful in interpreting the results.4
Complexity The measure of complexity comes from the Input-Output US matrix
provided in the STAN database and thus the Herfindahl measure computed is also used
with the UNIDO dataset. Input-Output data for the US in STAN is only available for
the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. For this reason, we can only compute the interaction
term for these three years.
Governance Indicators We use the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2011)
provided by the World Bank. Our preferred measure of the quality of contractual en-
forcement is the “Rule of Law.” According to the source, Rule of Law “reflects percep-
tions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Thus, the Rule of Law indicator
measures instances of the quality of contractual enforcement, as intended. The earliest
datapoint for this indicator is 1996 and, as a result, we construct the product of the
1995 complexity measure times the 1996 rule of law. The variables used in the interac-
tion terms for the other years (2000 and 2005) are each measure in the corresponding
years.5 We also report the results obtained using the other five governance indicators
provided by the same source (“voice and accountability,” “political stability,” “govern-
ment effectiveness,” “regulatory quality,” and “control of corruption”). The results are
reassuringly similar across indicators.
3.2 Results
All results are presented in tables placed at the end of the paper. Tables labeled “A”
were computed using the UNIDO dataset whereas those labeled “B” come from STAN
data. Our preferred functional form for estimation is that described in equations (6)
4Tables 9 through 11 at the end contain the list of countries included in each dataset as well as the
sectors.
5E.g. “rule of law” measured in 2000 times “1/Herfindahl” measured in 2000.
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and (7), where the data for all three available years is used. We have also preformed
individual-year regressions (not shown) and will discuss how the results compare across
both alternatives.
3.2.1 Allocation Effect
Baseline Table 1 presents the estimates of equation (6) (only estimates of β
1
are
shown). Rule of Law and other measures of governance do influence relatively more the
share of labor employed in more complex sectors. The effect is strongest under UNIDO
data. Recall that the UNIDO dataset covers many countries but only the manufacturing
sector, whereas STAN is not restrictive in terms of activity sectors but, instead, focusses
only on OECD countries. Coefficients in UNIDO are very significant (always at the
0.1% level) whereas with STAN statistical significance is not always attained. In fact,
for our preferred indicator of contracting quality, “Rule of Law,” the estimate of β
1
is only significant at the 5% level. For other governance indicators, however, such as
“Governmental Effectiveness,” “Regulatory Quality” and the “Control of Corruption,”
we get significance at the 0.1% level. Given STAN’s focus on developed economies which
have a much lower variance in the governance indicators, the finding of an effect in this
restrictive country sample is, in itself, noteworthy.
The magnitude of the effects is not trivial, and this is also the case for the STAN
sample. We provide a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation to gauge the magnitude of the
effects. Because the dependent variable is in logs, the coefficients are to be interpreted
as the percentage change in the labor share of a given sector whenever the interaction
variable changes by unity. Thus, in the UNIDO sample, a one unit change in the
right-hand side product of enforcement times complexity in a given sector will deliver
a 3.7% increase in the labor share of that sector. To put things in perspective, one
standard deviation in the Rule of Law indicator is 0.99 and the least complex sector has
a complexity index of 1.97. For this sector, a one standard deviation improvement in
the Rule of Law would lead to a 7% increase in its labor share. In STAN, our estimate
indicates a change of 1.1% in the labor share whenever the right-hand side interaction
value changes by unity. In this sample, the standard variation of the Rule of Law
indicator is about half of that in UNIDO, 0.55. For the least complex sector (which
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happens to be the same as in the UNIDO sample), the percentage change in its labor
share that goes together with a one standard deviation improvement in the Rule of Law
would be 1.2%.
Time Sensitivity To the extent that the indicators of governance are contemporane-
ously correlated with the labor share, it would be desirable to use lagged values of those
indicators. While the data used to compute the complexity indicator is only available
for the three years mentioned above, labor share data is readily available for all years
from 1996 till 2007 (and beyond). We thus perform two additional regressions to address
endogeneity concerns. We use leading values of the dependent variable, dated one and
two years ahead of the interaction term. For example, we construct a series with the
2006, 2001 and 1996 values of the labor share which we regress on the interaction of the
complexity and governance indicators measured in 2005, 2000 and 1995. We label this
the “one lead” regression. We do the same for the labor share measure two years ahead
of the interaction terms (thus regressing labor shares in 2007, 2002 and 1997 on the avail-
able interaction years). This is the “two lead” regression. Results are presented in Table
2. Estimates of β
1
are remarkably stable there, for both samples. Because other gover-
nance variables had appeared to have greater significance on the labor share in STAN,
we extended this dynamic comparison also to “Regulatory Quality” and “‘Control of
Corruption” (not shown). Similar patterns emerged. The stability of the coefficients
in the regressions with leading labor shares suggests that endogeneity is not a serious
concern for our results.
Additional Controls Next, we include additional controls to check for the possibility
that omitted variables might be biasing the results despite our inclusion of country, sector
and time dummies. We add sectoral log wages and log value added. Our motivation
to include these two additional variables is rooted on the theoretical examination of a
firm operating in a competitive environment with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) production function using capital and labor. The CES technology safeguards
the possibility that institutions may affect the productivity of labor and capital in a
differentiated manner, an outcome ruled out by the Cobb-Douglas technology. Once we
solve for the labor share of such a firm, we find that it depends on the sector’s aggregate
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value added and wages, and some other terms. The results are displayed in Table 3 for
our preferred indicator, the Rule of Law. In addition to the baseline case in column 1,
column 2 adds log wages and column three additionally includes value added. Columns
4 and 5 interact the variable log wages with a sectoral dummy, allowing the effect of
wages to be sector specific. This would capture technological differences across sectors
in terms of their human capital requirements.
Concerning UNIDO, Table 3A shows that the inclusion of the wages does not reduce
the significance of the interaction institutions times complexity term, and the size of the
coefficient is only slightly reduced. Because the log of value added is never significant
but including it leads to omission of observations due to missing data, we prefer the
specifications that do not include it. Comparing columns (2) and (4), we see that the
inclusion of log wages with an interaction effect improves the overall fit of the regression
(the adjustedR2 goes up by about 5 percentage points). Thus, our preferred specification
is that of column (4).
For STAN, Table 3B portrays a different story. The already marginally significant
coefficient of the baseline regression is rendered insignificant once log wages are included,
in any of the alternatives described above. .We thus conclude that, among developed
economies, good contracting quality is not associated with the way in which output is
organized across sectors. Here, looking at another governance indicator does not rescue
the significance of estimates of β
1
.
Splitting the UNIDO Sample Since the UNIDO sample covers all countries (up to
availability of data), we next try to break it into tiers reflecting percentiles of the world’s
productivity distribution. The question we want to address is whether the allocation and
productivity effects manifest themselves differently in different parts of that distribution.
Because we only have value added in manufacturing in the UNIDO sample, we took a
measure of output per worker from the Penn World Tables (PWT 7.1). We used the
variable “rgdpwok:” PPP converted GDP chain per worker at 2005 constant prices. Year
1995 was chosen since it is the earliest date in our sample. The correlation of rgdpwok
with other per person and per worker variables was very close to unity. Countries were
then ranked according to this variable and categorized into several groups: 10 or 20%
poorest economies, above or below median income, middle 50% (above the 25% poorest
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and below the 75% poorest) and, finally, restricted to be also represented in the STAN
sample.
Results are displayed in Table 4. Because of attrition in sectoral data, the regres-
sions covering the poorest groups often have significantly fewer observations than those
covering wealthier economies. With this caveat in mind, examination of the regressions
performed for the 10 and 20% poorest countries finds no trace of a disproportionate
effect of institutional quality on complex sectors. There is a strong and very significant
effect for economies above median income and the strongest effect (in terms of the β
1
estimate) is found in the economies ranking in the lowest 25%-75% income group. Here,
the estimate of β
1
, 0.03722, even exceeds slightly the baseline estimate, 0.03671. Fi-
nally, we restrict the sample to countries that are present in the STAN database as well.
Though we only have manufacturing subsectors in UNIDO (and STAN contains a much
larger sector exposure), the findings are the same as those in the STAN sample in that
the effect of interest is not found.
3.2.2 Productivity Effect
Baseline Tables 5A and 5B present estimates of equation (7). Here, there are im-
portant differences depending on the sample considered. With UNIDO data, estimates
are significant at the 0.1% level for all but one governance indicator. The effects are
quantitatively important. As before, because the dependent variable is in logs, estimates
of β
2
indicate the percentual change in productivity in a given sector following a unitary
change in the interaction term on the right-hand side. Thus, a unitary increment of
the product of institutional quality and complexity in a given sector would result in an
increase of 1.3% in the productivity of that sector. Using the numbers above, it follows
that the productivity of the least complex sector would increase by 2.6% following a
one standard deviation increment in that governance indicator (and by 21% in the most
complex). Under STAN data, however, involving only OECD countries, estimates are
not statistically different from zero.
Time Sensitivity In Table 6, regressions of leading series of productivity values on
past complexity and governance interactions are shown, replicating those performed for
the allocation effect. The stability of the coefficients and of their significance once again
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suggest that endogeneity is not a serious concern.
Additional Regressors We proceed by including additional regressors. Based on the
same framework as above (firms operating in a competitive environment under a CES
technology), we additionally include log wages, with and without interacting them with
sectoral dummies. As in all previous regressions, country, sector and time dummies are
included. Results are presented in Table 7. In the UNIDO sample, the size and signifi-
cance of β
2
estimates are affected by the inclusion of the wage variable. Still significance
is always in excess of 5% and the estimate increases slightly in the specification with sec-
toral interactions, our preferred one. Table 7B reinforces the fact that the productivity
effect is not present in STAN.
Splitting the UNIDO Sample We perform additional regressions by splitting the
sample in income groups, as above. Results are presented in Table 8. The flavor of the
results is the same as above. Attrition makes sample size smaller for poorer economy
groups. The effect of interest is not present among poor economies. This is still true for
the income group below the median. Once again, evidence supporting a disproportionate
impact of contracting quality in complex activity sectors is found in the subsample of
economies above median income. Estimates of β
2
are more than twice as large in this
subsample compared to the benchmark case. Among STAN economies, there is no effect.
Overall, we see the evidence supporting the allocation and productivity effects among
mid-income economies but not so among the wealthy or the very poor.
3.2.3 Simulation Exercise
The UNIDO data suggests that both productivity and allocation effects are at work in
the organization of production. In order to prod deeper into the relationship between
these two effects and output per worker, we perform a simple simulation exercise with
the 1995 subsample. We consider a one standard deviation improvement of the Rule
of Law indicator and compute the implied changes in sectoral labor shares as well as
productivity levels.6 We then compute new values of aggregate output per worker by
6Because labor shares must add to unity, we perform the following normalization. We first compute
the new sectoral labor shares by multiplying one standard deviation in the Rule of Law indicator times
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adding up the products of the modified productivity and labor shares. We then see how
they compare to the original values of aggregate value added per worker. Because of
the need to reshuffle labor across sectors as given by the modified labor shares, in this
exercise we restrict the observations to include only countries that have a complete range
of sectoral data. This leaves us with 23 countries (out of 145 in the full sample) and
18 sectors. This restriction may not be without consequences for it biases the sample
toward wealthier countries. Indeed, 12 out of the 23 countries considered have incomes
per worker ranking in the top 25% of the UNIDO sample and only 1 country’s income
per worker is in the bottom 25%. Further, only 10 countries have income per worker
in excess of the 25% poorest but above the 75% wealthiest. Recall that the middle
income range includes the countries where the allocation and productivity effects were
significant in our sample. In this restricted sample, there is thus overrepresentation of
the wealthy and underrepresentation of the poor.
We compute first the average growth rate of GDP per worker when both labor shares
and productivity are modified as above. Then we compute two other counterfactuals:
the average growth rate of GDP per worker (1) with the new labor shares but the initial
sectoral productivities and (2) with the original sectoral labor shares but with the new
productivity. The results are striking. We find that average GDP per worker increases on
average 15.4% as a result of the combined changes in productivity and labor shares; but
that it decreases on average by 5.04% if we give economies the new labor shares but keep
the original productivity. Further, maintaining the initial labor shares but allowing for
sectoral productivity to change yields the largest increase in GDP on average, 20.22%.
Table A
Average Growth Rate of GDP per Worker (%)
New labor share and productivity 15.4
New labor share, initial productivity −5.04
Initial labor share, new productivity 20.22
the sectoral complexity index and times the estimate of β
1
. We add these new labor shares across all
18 subsectors of manufacturing available in the UNIDO data. Because we are facing an improvement
in the Rule of Law, the sum exceeds unity. We compute the average new labor share and subtract the
difference of this average to unity from all sectoral labor shares, which then add to one.
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Note that, by construction, the computed growth rates of labor shares and productiv-
ity are perfectly correlated across countries (because they are the multiple of an estimate
of β
1
or β
2
times a sector complexity measure — given by the US measure for that sector
— and the common standard deviation of the Rule of Law for the sample). The latter
two factors in the product are common across countries for a given sector. Thus, by
design, the changes in labor shares put more weight in sectors whose productivity is also
being enlarged. How then do we interpret these findings?7
They strongly suggest that labor was efficiently allocated to the most productive
sectors in its original allocation. Further, they tell us that the gradient of change of
the labor shares, given by the product of institutional quality and sectoral complexity,
is not in line with the initial configuration of sectoral productivities. If indeed institu-
tions modified labor shares in a direction that were strongly correlated with the original
distribution of sectoral productivities, then our exercise would have delivered a positive
number also for the second row of Table A. In the limit, this could suggest that, while
contracting quality affects disproportionately more the productivity of complex sectors,
this is not the main determinant of productivity overall; and, should labor shares follow
productivity as theory would predict, then labor shares appear not to mimic the product
of institutions times complexity because other factors would have greater importance.
Before taking on this line of reasoning, we point out that the analysis in UNIDO is
confined to subsectors of manufacturing and not to the economy as a whole. It could
well be the case that an overall shift of labor away from manufacturing and toward other
sectors might lead to an overall enhancement of output per worker.
But let us now suppose that that is not the case: the change in sectoral labor shares
is not positively correlated with the existing productivity differentials across sectors. Is
this a concern for the quantitative relevance of institutions and contracting quality in the
organization of sectoral output? We think not. Factors such as intrinsic technological
differences across sectors should definitely have a first-order role in how labor is organized
across sectors. In the regressions, they were captured by the fixed effects. What our
numbers showed was that, once those are held fixed, contracting quality and other
institutional measures of governance still affect in a very large quantitative fashion how
7Restricting the sample even further to the set of countries to the middle 50% range in terms of
GDP per worker does not overturn the results above.
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labor is allocated across sectors, relatively more so the more complex the sector.
Caselli (2005) performed an accounting exercise similar to the present one in spirit
though our results are not directly comparable in a number of dimensions. He noticed
that the labor share of agriculture in poor countries is disproportionately large relative
to developed economies, and that agriculture is also a very low productivity sector in
those countries. He then computed several counterfactuals to assess the impact of this
situation: he considered giving poor countries the same labor share in agriculture as
developed economies, or to give them the productivity in agriculture attained in the US
(and other cases). Giving developing economies the same labor share in agriculture as
the US and keeping other things the same (namely productivity in agriculture and in the
remaining sectors) reduces cross-country income inequality by about two-thirds. Caselli
is effectively taking workers from a low productivity sector and moving them towards
other more productive areas of the economy. Thus, output per person can but increase
in that case. However, unlike in our case, in this particular simulation he was not trying
to address what part of these effects was accountable for by institutions.
4 Conclusion
The evidence put forth in this paper suggests that institutions may play an important
role in the allocation of labor across sectors, a new idea in the literature, beyond their
direct impact on productivity, which was also documented. These effects were found
to take place for economies in an intermediate range of the worldwide distribution of
output per worker and to be mute among two extreme groups in that distribution: poor
and developed economies. We see our findings as one more piece in the complex puzzle
of the determinants of living standards.
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5 Tables
Table 1A — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Labor Share] — cluster(sector,country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES rule law voice polstab gov effect reg quality contr corrpt
herfruleoflaw 0.03671***
(0.006)
herfvoiceaccount 0.0326***
(0.007)
herfpolstab 0.0311***
(0.006)
herfgeffect 0.0366***
(0.006)
herfregqual 0.0394***
(0.007)
herfcontcorrupt 0.0289***
(0.005)
Constant 0.77214*** 0.5396* 1.4905*** 0.8173*** 0.6720** 0.7495***
(0.206) (0.228) (0.315) (0.201) (0.207) (0.211)
Observations 4,312 4,321 4,303 4,312 4,312 4,312
Adjusted R-squared 0.507 0.505 0.504 0.507 0.507 0.505
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 1B — STAN data
Dependent Variable is Log[Labor Share] — cluster(sector,country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES rule law voice polstab gov effect reg quality contr corrpt
herfruleoflaw 0.01138*
(0.005)
herfvoiceaccount 0.0098
(0.005)
herfpolstab 0.0048
(0.004)
herfgeffect 0.0120**
(0.004)
herfregqual 0.0115**
(0.004)
herfcontcorrupt 0.0114**
(0.004)
Constant -0.65297** -0.7232** -0.5457*** -0.7213** -0.6783** -0.6785**
(0.251) (0.237) (0.160) (0.234) (0.238) (0.238)
Observations 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885
Adjusted R-squared 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.846 0.846 0.846
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2A — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Labor Share] —
time sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES coincident one lead two leads
herfruleoflaw 0.03671*** 0.03531*** 0.03720***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.77214*** 1.40713*** -0.46103
(0.206) (0.217) (0.660)
Observations 4,312 4,389 3,930
Adjusted R-squared 0.507 0.508 0.515
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 2B — STAN data
Dependent Variable is Log[Labor Share] —
time sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES coincident one lead two leads
herfruleoflaw 0.01138* 0.01189* 0.01268**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -0.65297** -0.59559* -0.89269***
(0.251) (0.242) (0.239)
Observations 2,885 2,887 2,815
Adjusted R-squared 0.845 0.848 0.850
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 3A — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Labor Share] — cluster(sector,country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES baseline, rule law Logw Logw, v.added Logw Logw, v.added
w sect inter w sect inter
herfruleoflaw 0.03671*** 0.03364*** 0.03560*** 0.03109*** 0.03147***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
lwages 0.17240*** 0.17650*
(0.065) (0.094)
lvaproductivity -0.01264 0.00393
(0.061) (0.061)
Constant -2.89917*** -3.71751*** -3.46961*** -6.37771*** -8.02431***
(0.618) (0.868) (0.865) (1.318) (1.198)
Observations 4,312 3,893 3,436 3,893 3,436
Adjusted R-squared 0.507 0.512 0.512 0.564 0.574
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3B — STAN data
Dependent Variable is Log[Labor Share] — cluster(sector,country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES baseline, rule of law Logw Logw, v.added Logw Logw, v.added
w sect inter w sect inter
herfruleoflaw 0.01138* 0.00165 0.00291 0.00029 0.00230
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lwages_ppp 0.82957*** 0.84367***
(0.023) (0.026)
lvaproductivity_ppp -0.25809*** -0.25596***
(0.038) (0.036)
Constant -1.79067*** -13.90843*** -18.21151*** -11.66254*** -18.86126***
(0.427) (0.395) (0.781) (0.488) (0.811)
Observations 2,885 2,050 1,937 2,050 1,937
Adjusted R-squared 0.845 0.968 0.973 0.969 0.974
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 4 — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Labor Share], cluster(sector,country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Baseline 10% Richest 10% Poorest 20% Poorest >= Median < Median Midle 50% STAN
herfruleoflaw 0.03671*** 0.01105 0.01908 -0.01502 0.03117*** 0.02151 0.03722*** 0.01358
(0.006) (0.019) (0.055) (0.033) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016)
Constant -2.89917*** -1.85575 -8.41246 -0.72162 -2.72314** -4.73189** -4.42218*** 0.39297
(0.618) (1.813) (5.512) (3.226) (0.837) (1.779) (0.978) (2.058)
Observations 4,312 669 257 493 2,615 1,697 2,276 1,025
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.430 0.738 0.586 0.518 0.553 0.578 0.412
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.051, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 5A — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Productivity] — cluster(sector,country)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES rule law voice polstab gov effect reg quality contr corrpt
herfruleoflaw 0.01334***
(0.004)
herfvoiceaccount 0.0182***
(0.004)
herfpolstab 0.0110**
(0.004)
herfgeffect 0.0160***
(0.004)
herfregqual 0.0172***
(0.004)
herfcontcorrupt 0.0118***
(0.003)
Constant 7.51510*** 7.5455*** 7.5185*** 7.5616*** 7.5235*** 7.5309***
(0.605) (0.602) (0.607) (0.600) (0.602) (0.604)
Observations 3,643 3,643 3,643 3,643 3,643 3,643
Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.808 0.807 0.807 0.808 0.807
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 5B — STAN data
Dependent Variable is Log[Productivity] — cluster(coutry,sector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES rule law voice polstab gov effect reg quality contr corrpt
herfruleoflaw_2 0.00420
(0.004)
herfvoiceaccount_2 0.0078
(0.006)
herfpolstab_2 0.0043
(0.004)
herfgeffect_2 0.0028
(0.004)
herfregqual_2 0.0022
(0.003)
herfcontcorrupt_2 0.0020
(0.003)
Constant 10.10037*** 10.0070*** 10.4256*** 10.5005*** 10.5669*** 10.5861***
(0.391) (0.607) (0.342) (0.425) (0.339) (0.338)
Observations 2,543 2,543 2,543 2,543 2,543 2,543
Adjusted R-squared 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 6A — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Productivity] — cluster(sector,country)
time sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES coincident one lead two leads
herfruleoflaw 0.01334*** 0.01599*** 0.01123**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 7.51510*** 8.41854*** 9.93828***
(0.605) (0.182) (0.922)
Observations 3,643 3,782 3,399
Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.814 0.813
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 6B — STAN data
Dependent Variable is Log[Productivity] — cluster(sector,country)
time sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES coincident one lead two leads
herfruleoflaw 0.00420 0.00117 -0.00158
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 10.52075*** 10.25078*** 11.43959***
(0.239) (0.224) (0.142)
Observations 2,543 2,548 2,525
Adjusted R-squared 0.847 0.849 0.849
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 7A — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Productivity], cluster(country, sector)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Baseline Log w Log w w/ sect inter
herfruleoflaw_2 0.01334*** 0.00765* 0.01457**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
lwages 0.87176***
(0.045)
Constant 6.18099*** 3.65278*** 3.21493***
(0.728) (1.020) (1.095)
Observations 3,643 3,473 3,473
Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.868 0.870
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 7B — STAN data
Dependent Variable is Log[Productivity], cluster(country,sector)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Baseline Log w Log w w/ sect inter
herfruleoflaw 0.00420 0.00272 0.00679
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
lwages_ppp 0.05079
(0.056)
Constant 10.10037*** 9.41174*** 9.26696***
(0.391) (1.442) (1.311)
Observations 2,543 1,937 1,937
Adjusted R-squared 0.847 0.845 0.856
Robust standard errors in parentheses, sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 8 — UNIDO data
Dependent Variable is Log[Productivity], cluster (country,sector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Baseline 10% Richest 10% Poorest 20% Poorest >= Median < Median Midle 50% STAN
herfruleoflaw 0.01334*** -0.00079 0.09587 0.05464 0.01137* 0.01717 0.03046*** -0.0006
(0.004) (0.011) (0.048) (0.033) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009
Constant 6.18099*** 9.31899*** -3.74708 4.15491 8.42484*** 6.08730*** 6.46214*** 9.85153*
(0.728) (1.166) (4.890) (3.287) (1.116) (1.243) (0.810) (0.896
Observations 3,643 596 203 340 2,351 1,292 1,880 965
Adjusted R2 0.807 0.703 0.523 0.553 0.775 0.634 0.696 0.692
Robust standard errors in parentheses; sector, country and time dummies
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 9 — List of sectors (UNIDO: only sectors 3 through 20)
Number in Dataset Sector Name
1 C01T05 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
2 C10T14 Mining and quarrying
3 C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco
4 C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
5 C20 Wood and products of wood and cork
6 C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
7 C23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
8 C24 Chemicals and chemical products
9 C25 Rubber and plastics products
10 C26 Other non-metallic mineral products
11 C27 Basic metals
12 C28 Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment
13 C29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c
14 C30 Office, accounting and computing machinery
15 C31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c
16 C32 Radio, television and communication equipment
17 C33 Medical, precision and optical instruments
18 C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
19 C35 Other transport equipment
20 C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling
21 C40t41 Electricity, gas and water supply
22 C45 Construction
23 C50T52 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs
24 C55 Hotels and restaurants
25 C60T63 Transport and storage
26 C64 Post and telecommunications
27 C65T67 Finance and insurance
28 C70 Real estate activities
29 C71 Renting of machinery and equipment
29
30 C72 Computer and related activities
31 C73 Research and development
32 C74 Other Business Activities
33 C75 Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security
34 C80 Education
35 C85 Health and social work
36 C90T93 Other community, social and personal services
37 C95 Private households with employed persons
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Table 10 — Countries in UNIDO dataset
Country number in dataset Country name
4 Afghanistan
8 Albania
12 Algeria
31 Azerbaijan
32 Argentina
36 Australia
40 Austria
44 Bahamas
50 Bangladesh
51 Armenia
52 Barbados
56 Belgium
60 Bermuda
68 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
70 Bosnia and Herzegovina
72 Botswana
76 Brazil
100 Bulgaria
104 Myanmar
112 Belarus
116 Cambodia
120 Cameroon
124 Canada
144 Sri Lanka
152 Chile
156 China
158 China, Taiwan Province
170 Colombia
184 Cook Islands
31
188 Costa Rica
191 Croatia
196 Cyprus
203 Czech Republic
208 Denmark
214 Dominican Republic
218 Ecuador
222 El Salvador
231 Ethiopia
232 Eritrea
233 Estonia
242 Fiji
246 Finland
250 France
266 Gabon
268 Georgia
270 Gambia
275 Palestinian Territories
276 Germany
288 Ghana
300 Greece
320 Guatemala
332 Haiti
340 Honduras
344 China, Hong Kong SAR
348 Hungary
352 Iceland
356 India
360 Indonesia
364 Iran (Islamic Republic of)
372 Ireland
32
376 Israel
380 Italy
384 Côte d’Ivoire
388 Jamaica
392 Japan
398 Kazakhstan
400 Jordan
404 Kenya
410 Republic of Korea
414 Kuwait
417 Kyrgyzstan
418 Lao People’s Dem Rep
422 Lebanon
426 Lesotho
428 Latvia
438 Liechtenstein
440 Lithuania
442 Luxembourg
446 China, Macao SAR
450 Madagascar
454 Malawi
458 Malaysia
470 Malta
480 Mauritius
484 Mexico
496 Mongolia
498 Republic of Moldova
504 Morocco
508 Mozambique
512 Oman
524 Nepal
33
528 Netherlands
530 Netherlands
531 Curaçao
533 Aruba
554 New Zealand
562 Niger
566 Nigeria
578 Norway
586 Pakistan
590 Panama
598 Papua New Guinea
600 Paraguay
604 Peru
608 Philippines
616 Poland
620 Portugal
630 Puerto Rico
634 Qatar
642 Romania
643 Russian Federation
646 Rwanda
682 Saudi Arabia
686 Senegal
702 Singapore
703 Slovakia
704 Viet Nam
705 Slovenia
710 South Africa
716 Zimbabwe
724 Spain
736 Sudan (including South Sudan)
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740 Suriname
748 Swaziland
752 Sweden
756 Switzerland
760 Syrian Arab Republic
762 Tajikistan
764 Thailand
776 Tonga
780 Trinidad and Tobago
788 Tunisia
792 Turkey
800 Uganda
804 Ukraine
807 The f. Yugosl. Rep. of Macedonia
818 Egypt
826 United Kingdom
834 United Republic of Tanzania
840 United States of America
854 Burkina Faso
858 Uruguay
862 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
887 Yemen
891 Serbia and Montenegro
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Table 11 — Countries in STAN Database
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
36
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
West Germany
37
